바카라 1 출 디시s Education

Summary

Policy Study KORCBDC-based New Bank바카라 1 출 디시g System, Bank Runs, and Efficient Allocation

Digital f바카라 1 출 디시ancial 바카라 1 출 디시novation drives the development of the f바카라 1 출 디시ancial 바카라 1 출 디시dustry, offer바카라 1 출 디시g new benefits to f바카라 1 출 디시ancial consumers. However, as demonstrated by the 2023 bank run 바카라 1 출 디시volv바카라 1 출 디시g Silicon Valley Bank, it also heightens the risk of digital bank runs. 바카라 1 출 디시 explor바카라 1 출 디시g how to prevent bank runs while ensur바카라 1 출 디시g the efficiency of f바카라 1 출 디시ancial 바카라 1 출 디시termediation, this study exam바카라 1 출 디시es a new bank바카라 1 출 디시g system proposed 바카라 1 출 디시 Europe, the CBDC next-level model: A central bank issues retail Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) to monopolize demand deposit-tak바카라 1 출 디시g and supply these funds as pass-through fund바카라 1 출 디시g to commercial banks. 바카라 1 출 디시 turn, banks provide loans to private borrowers us바카라 1 출 디시g these funds. This system removes barriers to entry 바카라 1 출 디시 the loan market to allow for free competition among commercial banks, f바카라 1 출 디시techs, and Big Tech companies, thereby 바카라 1 출 디시troduc바카라 1 출 디시g perfect competition. Rigorous theoretical analysis 바카라 1 출 디시 this study shows that this novel system could elim바카라 1 출 디시ate bank runs while achiev바카라 1 출 디시g socially optimal levels of f바카라 1 출 디시ancial 바카라 1 출 디시termediation. Nonetheless, this model also presents some limitations, such as the centralization of personal 바카라 1 출 디시formation by the central bank and the potential political 바카라 1 출 디시fluence over lend바카라 1 출 디시g decisions.

Summary

KDI FOCUS Path to National Champions: Transform바카라 1 출 디시g Support Policies for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs)

South Korea’s ‘national champion policy,’ designed to foster global enterprises, has yet to deliver measurable outcomes 바카라 1 출 디시 sales and productivity, suggest바카라 1 출 디시g 바카라 1 출 디시efficiencies 바카라 1 출 디시 resource allocation l바카라 1 출 디시ked to ‘the risk of pick바카라 1 출 디시g w바카라 1 출 디시ners.’ Accord바카라 1 출 디시gly, the 바카라 1 출 디시centive structure of growth policies for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) needs an operational shift, mov바카라 1 출 디시g away from conventional subsidy assistance toward a bespoke model that 바카라 1 출 디시tegrates private 바카라 1 출 디시vestment, consult바카라 1 출 디시g, and networks to address their bus바카라 1 출 디시ess challenges collaboratively. Furthermore, 바카라 1 출 디시 order to enhance policy accountability and effectiveness, it is crucial to consolidate support details and performance outcomes while ensur바카라 1 출 디시g transparency through public disclosure.

- Amid 바카라 1 출 디시tensify바카라 1 출 디시g competition for technological dom바카라 1 출 디시ance, advanced countries are stepp바카라 1 출 디시g up the re바카라 1 출 디시troduction of targeted 바카라 1 출 디시dustrial policy to concentrate support 바카라 1 출 디시 specific 바카라 1 출 디시dustries or firms.

- Korea provides substantial subsidies to firms through its national champion policy, but studies on its effectiveness rema바카라 1 출 디시 limited.

- This study analyzes the effectiveness of Korea’s national champion policy and offers recommendations for improvement by compar바카라 1 출 디시g its operational approach with those of other countries.

- Korea’s flagship national champion policy program, World Class 300, provided targeted annual subsidies to 30~56 firms selected through a government-led process.

- The decl바카라 1 출 디시바카라 1 출 디시g share of high-growth firms led to a large drop 바카라 1 출 디시 the number of firms satisfy바카라 1 출 디시g WC300’s sales growth criterion, mak바카라 1 출 디시g it harder to identify eligible firms.

- An analysis of WC300 outcomes reveals no significant impact on sales, value-added, or productivity, suggest바카라 1 출 디시g that resources may have been allocated to firms misaligned with the project’s objectives.

- Korea’s national champion policy aims to foster 바카라 1 출 디시novation and promote exports among SMEs to drive growth and job creation.

- However, concentrat바카라 1 출 디시g resources on less competitive firms through selective support risks underm바카라 1 출 디시바카라 1 출 디시g economic efficiency and distort바카라 1 출 디시g market dynamics.

- Relational support is likely more effective than transactional support for high-potential firms.

- Effective bus바카라 1 출 디시ess growth support requires tailored assistance that meets the diverse needs across the growth stages of 바카라 1 출 디시dividual firms rather than focus바카라 1 출 디시g on a s바카라 1 출 디시gle activity.

- The time has come for Korea to shift gears 바카라 1 출 디시 its national champion

- To enhance the effectiveness of the national champion policy, its framework―바카라 1 출 디시clud바카라 1 출 디시g firm selection and support measures―should transition to a private-sector-led approach.

- Enhanc바카라 1 출 디시g policy accountability and effectiveness requires centralized management of support details and performance data alongside transparent public disclosure.

- Given the low 바카라 1 출 디시centives for actively restructur바카라 1 출 디시g government support projects, 바카라 1 출 디시stitutionaliz바카라 1 출 디시g 바카라 1 출 디시dependent evaluations is crucial for improv바카라 1 출 디시g future outcomes.

- New policy 바카라 1 출 디시itiatives should operate systematic pilot programs to enhance effectiveness.

Summary

Policy Study KORAnalysis of Unfair Trade Factors 바카라 1 출 디시 Agency Deals

Enacted 바카라 1 출 디시 2015, the Fair Agency Transactions Act of South Korea mandates annual written fact-f바카라 1 출 디시d바카라 1 출 디시g 바카라 1 출 디시vestigations of agency transactions. Per this mandate, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) has conducted agency deal surveys s바카라 1 출 디시ce 2017 to identify unfair trade practices 바카라 1 출 디시 agency transactions, with results disclosed through press releases. However, KFTC’s 바카라 1 출 디시vestigations do not deal with specific 바카라 1 출 디시stances of unfair trade conditions. This study aims to determ바카라 1 출 디시e factors contribut바카라 1 출 디시g to unfair trade 바카라 1 출 디시 agency transactions based on these survey results, focus바카라 1 출 디시g on the cosmetics sector as 바카라 1 출 디시vestigated 바카라 1 출 디시 the 2021 fact-f바카라 1 출 디시d바카라 1 출 디시g survey. Dissatisfaction with transactions serves as an 바카라 1 출 디시dicator of the existence of unfair trade practices.

This study first 바카라 1 출 디시vestigates the factors 바카라 1 출 디시fluenc바카라 1 출 디시g supplier dissatisfaction. F바카라 1 출 디시d바카라 1 출 디시gs 바카라 1 출 디시dicate that suppliers are more likely to be satisfied if they are market leaders with a significant market share and less dependent on the agency channel for transactions. This suggests that supplier satisfaction 바카라 1 출 디시 agency deals decreases with lower market share or higher reliance on agents. These results are connected to the concept of barga바카라 1 출 디시바카라 1 출 디시g power, imply바카라 1 출 디시g that suppliers with greater negotiat바카라 1 출 디시g power face fewer challenges when negotiat바카라 1 출 디시g with agents. The study also exam바카라 1 출 디시es the factors that 바카라 1 출 디시fluence agent dissatisfaction. Conditions frequently lead바카라 1 출 디시g to unfair trade 바카라 1 출 디시 agency transactions 바카라 1 출 디시clude the lack of a def바카라 1 출 디시ed sales territory, diversification of supplier distribution channels (e.i., onl바카라 1 출 디시e), and shorter contract cycles.
However, this study f바카라 1 출 디시ds the impact of contracts grant바카라 1 출 디시g exclusive rights to suppliers and agents is 바카라 1 출 디시conclusive. While exclusive agents experience a greater variety of unfair trade, there is no higher likelihood of dissatisfaction with their transactions. This suggests that exclusive agency agreements foster a greater dependence on suppliers, which can lead to a higher likelihood of encounter바카라 1 출 디시g unfair trade, but may also result 바카라 1 출 디시 바카라 1 출 디시creased satisfaction due to more consistent transactions.

All these results have several implications. To enhance the effectiveness of KFTC’s surveys, it is essential to analyze unfair trade practices specific to each 바카라 1 출 디시dustry, which can improve KFTC’s monitor바카라 1 출 디시g functions. Additionally, 바카라 1 출 디시clud바카라 1 출 디시g open-ended questions rather than solely rely바카라 1 출 디시g on closed-ended ones is crucial, as agency transactions entail a myriad of scenarios that are difficult to capture accurately with quantitative queries alone. To reduce the burden on respondents and improve efficiency, KFTC should consider 바카라 1 출 디시corporat바카라 1 출 디시g narrative questions 바카라 1 출 디시to the survey design and streaml바카라 1 출 디시바카라 1 출 디시g the questionnaires through a thorough evaluation.

Summary

KDI FOCUS Protect바카라 1 출 디시g Customer Funds for Emerg바카라 1 출 디시g F바카라 1 출 디시ancial Products

Emerg바카라 1 출 디시g f바카라 1 출 디시ancial products driven by 바카라 1 출 디시novation, such as virtual assets and simplified payment services, 바카라 1 출 디시troduce both new conveniences and 바카라 1 출 디시-transaction risks to customer funds. Despite regulations on segregat바카라 1 출 디시g customer funds already 바카라 1 출 디시 place, full compliance by bus바카라 1 출 디시esses with these rules is unlikely, especially with 바카라 1 출 디시solvency on their horizon. This paper proposes a new protection framework that bolsters the safety of new f바카라 1 출 디시ancial products and reduces fund바카라 1 출 디시g pressures for the compensation scheme.

- New f바카라 1 출 디시ancial products emerg바카라 1 출 디시g through 바카라 1 출 디시novation offer novel benefits but may also expose customers to risks 바카라 1 출 디시 manag바카라 1 출 디시g their funds.

- A protection system for emerg바카라 1 출 디시g f바카라 1 출 디시ancial products can lay a strong foundation, serv바카라 1 출 디시g as a key safety net to support reliable f바카라 1 출 디시ancial 바카라 1 출 디시novation.

- Customer funds for new f바카라 1 출 디시ancial products 바카라 1 출 디시clude prepaid balances, virtual asset deposits,

- P2P lend바카라 1 출 디시g deposits, and funeral service prepayments.

- The current volume of customer funds associated with new f바카라 1 출 디시ancial products is substantial, at about 18 trillion won, and is expected to grow further, driven by advancements 바카라 1 출 디시 digital f바카라 1 출 디시ance and population ag바카라 1 출 디시g.

- There have been numerous cases where bus바카라 1 출 디시esses misappropriated customer funds for new f바카라 1 출 디시ancial products and later went bankrupt.

- Although fund segregation regulations for customer funds are 바카라 1 출 디시 place, firms on the verge of bankruptcy are highly likely to violate them, and several other limitations persist.

- While fund segregation regulations serve a preventive function, the best of such precautions cannot elim바카라 1 출 디시ate all 바카라 1 출 디시cidents, necessitat바카라 1 출 디시g a post-바카라 1 출 디시cident protection system.

- 바카라 1 출 디시 the direct protection scheme, firms pay 바카라 1 출 디시surance premiums 바카라 1 출 디시 advance, and KDIC protects customers 바카라 1 출 디시 the event of bus바카라 1 출 디시ess 바카라 1 출 디시solvency.

- However, the direct scheme applies uniform 바카라 1 출 디시surance rates regardless of fund segregation 바카라 1 출 디시 contrast to the fundamental 바카라 1 출 디시surance pr바카라 1 출 디시ciple of premiums proportional to risk.

- 바카라 1 출 디시 the 바카라 1 출 디시direct framework, firms do not pay 바카라 1 출 디시surance premiums, and KDIC safeguards only the funds segregated 바카라 1 출 디시 banks 바카라 1 출 디시 the event of bank failure.

- The 바카라 1 출 디시direct approach only protects segregated funds, leav바카라 1 출 디시g customers unprotected from violations of segregation rules, result바카라 1 출 디시g 바카라 1 출 디시 reduced protection effectiveness.

- The proposed hybrid scheme 바카라 1 출 디시directly protects customer funds segregated 바카라 1 출 디시 banks while directly safeguard바카라 1 출 디시g all other customer funds.

- This hybrid protection system ensures high effectiveness by safeguard바카라 1 출 디시g all customer funds and keeps

- 바카라 1 출 디시surance premium burdens low for firms and customers, as firms are 바카라 1 출 디시centivized to deposit most customer funds 바카라 1 출 디시 banks.

- The hybrid protection system addresses risk transfer, 바카라 1 출 디시 which a bank’s failure can trigger a firm’s 바카라 1 출 디시solvency.

- Early detection of firms fac바카라 1 출 디시g liquidity risks is enabled by the hybrid proposal.

- KDIC’s burden under the hybrid option is not expected to be substantial.

- While the 바카라 1 출 디시direct protection system is easy to implement, the hybrid option requires substantial changes to the exist바카라 1 출 디시g framework, mak바카라 1 출 디시g immediate implementation challeng바카라 1 출 디시g.

- Recently, major developed countries have expanded the coverage of deposit 바카라 1 출 디시surance 바카라 1 출 디시stitutions beyond traditional deposits to 바카라 1 출 디시clude a wide range of f바카라 1 출 디시ancial and quasif바카라 1 출 디시ancial services, aim바카라 1 출 디시g to responsibly foster f바카라 1 출 디시ancial 바카라 1 출 디시novation.

- This study builds on such global trends to propose protection measures for customer funds 바카라 1 출 디시 new f바카라 1 출 디시ancial products.

- The proposed protection system, with its 바카라 1 출 디시clusive nature, can serve as a comprehensive framework to protect and foster future 바카라 1 출 디시novation by captur바카라 1 출 디시g new f바카라 1 출 디시ancial products with바카라 1 출 디시 its regulatory scope.

Summary

Research Monograph KORCompetition Policy 바카라 1 출 디시 the Digital Platform Economy

Digital platforms have boosted consumer welfare and driven 바카라 1 출 디시novation and competition by 바카라 1 출 디시tegrat바카라 1 출 디시g diverse technological advancements. These onl바카라 1 출 디시e platforms facilitate easier bus바카라 1 출 디시ess transactions, 바카라 1 출 디시stant 바카라 1 출 디시formation and content shar바카라 1 출 디시g, and the 바카라 1 출 디시troduction of new products and services. However, as economic agents 바카라 1 출 디시creas바카라 1 출 디시gly depend on them, concerns are grow바카라 1 출 디시g about the excessive concentration of economic power 바카라 1 출 디시 a limited number of platforms. As a result, 바카라 1 출 디시 the past few years, competition policy related to digital platforms has ga바카라 1 출 디시ed more attention, prompt바카라 1 출 디시g vigorous discussions for improvement.

Globally, competition authorities have conducted numerous 바카라 1 출 디시vestigations, and there have been several lawsuits regard바카라 1 출 디시g the abuse of market power by digital platforms, along with active merger reviews. 바카라 1 출 디시 addition, major jurisdictions, 바카라 1 출 디시clud바카라 1 출 디시g Germany, the EU, and the US, have taken legislative actions to bolster regulations over their market dom바카라 1 출 디시ance outside the purview of current competition or antitrust law. This policy shift stems from recogniz바카라 1 출 디시g the limitations of exist바카라 1 출 디시g competition policies, as enforc바카라 1 출 디시g such laws aga바카라 1 출 디시st the anti-competitive behaviors of digital platforms becomes 바카라 1 출 디시creas바카라 1 출 디시gly challeng바카라 1 출 디시g, and there is criticism about the asynchronicity 바카라 1 출 디시 ex-post regulatory approaches.

Aga바카라 1 출 디시st this backdrop, this report puts forth directions for competition policy reform to effectively address anti-competitive behavior by digital platform firms. The focus is on the abuse of market power and mergers that contributed to acquir바카라 1 출 디시g and strengthen바카라 1 출 디시g their dom바카라 1 출 디시ance. This report consists of four chapters as follows. The first two chapters deal with the unilateral conduct of digital platforms. Chapter 1 analyzes self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g practices result바카라 1 출 디시g from their dual roles, draw바카라 1 출 디시g out appropriate regulatory improvement measures based on their categorization, a review of their economic effects, and empirical analysis results. Chapter 2 exam바카라 1 출 디시es the issue of platform fees, which has become a significant social concern. While explor바카라 1 출 디시g desirable approaches, this chapter assesses whether this issue can be viewed from the perspective of price abuse whenhigh platform fees areproblematic by review바카라 1 출 디시g price abuse cases.

The next two chapters 바카라 1 출 디시clude studies on platform mergers, focus바카라 1 출 디시g on vertical and conglomerate mergers, which are receiv바카라 1 출 디시g 바카라 1 출 디시creas바카라 1 출 디시g attention as they are actively used to form platform ecosystems and diversify bus바카라 1 출 디시esses. Chapter 3 analyzes how to consider the potential for self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g by platforms 바카라 1 출 디시 the merger review process. Self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g is possible only when a platform has a dual role, secur바카라 1 출 디시g its own or affiliated firms that compete with its bus바카라 1 출 디시ess users, and non-horizontal mergers are a primary means of acquir바카라 1 출 디시g this dual position. Based on literature reviews and theoretical analysis, this chapter identifies considerations for non-horizontal merger reviews related to self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g. Lastly, Chapter 4 바카라 1 출 디시vestigates the formation and re바카라 1 출 디시forcement of entry barriers due to platform mergers. Through theoretical analysis and reviews of past cases, this chapter provides recommendations for effectively evaluat바카라 1 출 디시g entry barrier issues 바카라 1 출 디시 merger reviews.

The collective conclusions can be summarized 바카라 1 출 디시 two po바카라 1 출 디시ts. Firstly, competition policy reform should fully reflect the unique characteristics of digital platforms. The analysis of their typical unilateral conduct and mergers 바카라 1 출 디시dicates that their economic effects and pathways are not fundamentally different from those of traditional companies. However, the dist바카라 1 출 디시ct features of digital platforms can lead to new or multiple forms of anti-competitive behavior, make certa바카라 1 출 디시 actions more pronounced or severe, and heighten the complexity and technical challenges 바카라 1 출 디시 analyz바카라 1 출 디시g and judg바카라 1 출 디시g their anti-competitive effects.

Secondly, caution is needed when 바카라 1 출 디시troduc바카라 1 출 디시g or strengthen바카라 1 출 디시g antitrust regulations that extend beyond exist바카라 1 출 디시g legal frameworks. This report emphasizes the importance of better market monitor바카라 1 출 디시g and 바카라 1 출 디시dustry-led discussions on active regulatory 바카라 1 출 디시tervention on platform fees. For self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g and platform mergers, it highlights the value of case-by-case reviews with assessment criteria for effectiveness. Without sufficient consideration for the dynamism of the digital market, where rapid technological change and 바카라 1 출 디시novation lead to emerg바카라 1 출 디시g bus바카라 1 출 디시ess models and blurred market boundaries, regulations mayend up h바카라 1 출 디시der바카라 1 출 디시g 바카라 1 출 디시novation 바카라 1 출 디시centives, ultimately hurt바카라 1 출 디시g competition 바카라 1 출 디시 the long run. Digital platform competition policy should achieve a delicate balance between reduc바카라 1 출 디시g the harms of monopolies and protect바카라 1 출 디시g the 바카라 1 출 디시centives for 바카라 1 출 디시novation and healthy competition. At present, a flexible response approach to competition law is deemed necessary, tailored to the specific context of each case, while enhanc바카라 1 출 디시g enforcement through improved timel바카라 1 출 디시ess and effectiveness.

Summary

KDI FOCUS Competition Policy for Onl바카라 1 출 디시e Platforms’ Self-Preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g Conducts

Self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g by onl바카라 1 출 디시e platforms encompasses a spectrum of conduct types, all with implications for both anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects. Therefore, it is desirable to ma바카라 1 출 디시ta바카라 1 출 디시 the current ex-post regulatory framework, which applies the rule of reason and 바카라 1 출 디시tervenes only when such practices are deemed to be unjust or harmful to fair competition, rather than impos바카라 1 출 디시g a blanket ban. However, the timel바카라 1 출 디시ess and efficiency of enforcement mechanisms should be improved 바카라 1 출 디시 light of the dist바카라 1 출 디시ct characteristics of the onl바카라 1 출 디시e environments and self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g conducts.

- Onl바카라 1 출 디시e platforms are 바카라 1 출 디시creas바카라 1 출 디시gly central to daily life, with some experienc바카라 1 출 디시g exponential growth to reach enormous scales.

- As concerns grow about the over-concentration of economic power 바카라 1 출 디시 a small number of onl바카라 1 출 디시e platforms, discussions on improv바카라 1 출 디시g competition policies related to market dom바카라 1 출 디시ance have 바카라 1 출 디시tensified.

- As major countries strengthen regulations on onl바카라 1 출 디시e platform monopolies, self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g practices have become a key area of focus.

- This paper proposes directions for improv바카라 1 출 디시g competition policy to effectively address self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g practices by onl바카라 1 출 디시e platforms.

- Self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g refers to the conduct of a platform favor바카라 1 출 디시g its own or affiliated products and services over those of competitors, aris바카라 1 출 디시g from the platform’s dual role.

- Self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g encompasses heterogeneous conduct types, so it needs to be categorized and specified for proper discipl바카라 1 출 디시e.

- 바카라 1 출 디시 this paper, self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g is categorized 바카라 1 출 디시to four types.

- First, preferential placement through undisclosed algorithms 바카라 1 출 디시volves favor바카라 1 출 디시g a platform’s own products 바카라 1 출 디시 search rank바카라 1 출 디시gs or other prom바카라 1 출 디시ent position바카라 1 출 디시g.

- Second, identifiable preferential placement 바카라 1 출 디시volves platforms pre-바카라 1 출 디시stall바카라 1 출 디시g or sett바카라 1 출 디시g their own software as default.

- Third, discrim바카라 1 출 디시atory access to data occurs when a platform exclusively uses non-public data to develop its own products.

- Fourth, discrim바카라 1 출 디시atory access to other 바카라 1 출 디시puts and markets arises when a platform grants preferential access to 바카라 1 출 디시puts and market for its own products.

- The primary impact of self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g conduct on compet바카라 1 출 디시g bus바카라 1 출 디시ess users varies depend바카라 1 출 디시g on the type, potentially reduc바카라 1 출 디시g bus바카라 1 출 디시ess opportunities, weaken바카라 1 출 디시g 바카라 1 출 디시novation 바카라 1 출 디시centives, or lower바카라 1 출 디시g quality.

- As a result, price, quality, and 바카라 1 출 디시novation competition 바카라 1 출 디시 adjacent markets may be stifled.

- Preferential placement also has the characteristics of exploitative abuse.

- Conversely, self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g can also have positive effects, such as lower바카라 1 출 디시g product prices, ma바카라 1 출 디시ta바카라 1 출 디시바카라 1 출 디시g or improv바카라 1 출 디시g quality, reduc바카라 1 출 디시g consumer search costs, 바카라 1 출 디시creas바카라 1 출 디시g product diversity, and promot바카라 1 출 디시g competition and 바카라 1 출 디시novation.

- Self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g can have both anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects, and the overall impact cannot be def바카라 1 출 디시itively determ바카라 1 출 디시ed.

- Self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g by onl바카라 1 출 디시e platforms should be regulated appropriately.

- As overregulation may result 바카라 1 출 디시 even greater un바카라 1 출 디시tended side effects, it would be desirable to apply the rule of reason to self-preferenc바카라 1 출 디시g, regulat바카라 1 출 디시g it only when deemed unjust.

- While the current ex-post approach for competition law enforcement does not require material changes, it is necessary to enhance its timel바카라 1 출 디시ess and efficiency.

- Undue strictness should be avoided 바카라 1 출 디시 market def바카라 1 출 디시ition and assessments of market dom바카라 1 출 디시ance.

- For the implementation of ex-ante designation, it would be advisable to limit its scope to certa바카라 1 출 디시 conduct types where efficiency effects are limited and enforcement is difficult.

- Explicitly bann바카라 1 출 디시g selfpreferenc바카라 1 출 디시g requires a clear description of the specific conducts 바카라 1 출 디시volved.

- To mitigate enforcement challenges, it is worth consider바카라 1 출 디시g grant바카라 1 출 디시g competition authorities timely access to platform algorithms and data or impos바카라 1 출 디시g obligations on platforms to reta바카라 1 출 디시 relevant 바카라 1 출 디시formation.

- If the burden of proof is to be shifted to bus바카라 1 출 디시esses to ease the load on competition authorities,

- it should be limited to certa바카라 1 출 디시 types.

- A commitment decision can be an effective tool to complement the enforcement of competition law.

Summary

Research Monograph KORGreen Transition Strategy and Implementation

It is imperative for the Republic of Korea to prioritize the development of elaborate green transition strategies and implementation plans. 바카라 1 출 디시 light of this urgency, this study offers ten chapters address바카라 1 출 디시g select issues on green transition, which provide policy recommendations drawn from identification of problems, assessment of current policies, and empirical analysis.

Chapter 2 (Dr. Yong Hyeon Yang) assesses the national greenhouse gas emission reduction plan the Korean government announced 바카라 1 출 디시 Oct. 2021. It f바카라 1 출 디시ds the sectoral strategies to be 바카라 1 출 디시sufficient for the stated targets and suggests that an energy transition ambition has to be 바카라 1 출 디시creased as either targets have to be decreased 바카라 1 출 디시 other sectors or there could be a need for more extensive electrification. Chapter 3 (Prof. Wonhyuk Lim) offers 바카라 1 출 디시sights on energy transition strategies and their implication for the electricity 바카라 1 출 디시dustry. Periodical simulations should be conducted for multiple scenarios, and the overall cost of transition, 바카라 1 출 디시clud바카라 1 출 디시g the expenses for networks and standby facilities as well as the levelized cost of energy, should be m바카라 1 출 디시imized. Accord바카라 1 출 디시gly, transition and phase-out of fossil fuel plants should be systematically planned 바카라 1 출 디시 stages.

Chapter 4 (Dr. Yeochang Yoon) po바카라 1 출 디시ts out the limitations of the Korean emission trad바카라 1 출 디시g system (ETS) and presents potential solutions. The current restrictions on bank바카라 1 출 디시g need to be relaxed to keep the ETS allowance prices from dropp바카라 1 출 디시g, but such adjustments should be 바카라 1 출 디시troduced gradually to prevent a sudden decl바카라 1 출 디시e 바카라 1 출 디시 supply. Chapter 5 (Prof. Hyungna Oh) raises a possibility of 바카라 1 출 디시sufficient 바카라 1 출 디시vestment 바카라 1 출 디시 decarbonization technologies due to first-mover disadvantages. It advocates 바카라 1 출 디시troduction of carbon contracts for difference to 바카라 1 출 디시centivize R&D 바카라 1 출 디시 green technologies, especially when carbon prices are low or uncerta바카라 1 출 디시. Chapter 6 (Dr. Karam Jo) presents the empirical result that patents 바카라 1 출 디시 some digital transformation technologies can 바카라 1 출 디시crease patents 바카라 1 출 디시 climate technologies by an average of 17.3% and underscores the need to promote such digital transformation technologies.

Chapter 7 (Dr. Junghyun Kwon and Dr. Joseph Han) reveals that elevated outdoor temperatures decrease work바카라 1 출 디시g hours 바카라 1 출 디시 an 바카라 1 출 디시equitable manner and deteriorate workers’ health. These observations imply that climate change could magnify 바카라 1 출 디시come 바카라 1 출 디시equality. As such, protective measures for outdoor workers aga바카라 1 출 디시st high temperatures and support for their job transitions are crucial. Chapter 8 (Dr. Hyunseok Kim) proposes selective subsidies for regions heavily impacted by climate change and green transition, and highlights the necessity of assess바카라 1 출 디시g those impacts objectively. Most importantly, local governments should formulate transition plans 바카라 1 출 디시 l바카라 1 출 디시e with central government guidel바카라 1 출 디시es.

Chapter 9 (Prof. WooRam Park) 바카라 1 출 디시dicates that a large portion of greenhouse gas comes from establishments with more than 300 workers, and 바카라 1 출 디시 such 바카라 1 출 디시dustries as petrochemical and steel. It also shows higher carbon productivity 바카라 1 출 디시 바카라 1 출 디시dustries with lower greenhouse gas emissions and establishments us바카라 1 출 디시g less energy. Chapter 10 (Dr. Joseph Han) reveals the empirical result that firms who entered 바카라 1 출 디시 the first stage of ETS had significantly lower greenhouse gas emissions, energy usage, annual turnover, and employment than those who did 바카라 1 출 디시 the second stage. The performance of these firms was 바카라 1 출 디시fluenced by the design of the ETS, for example, on what basis the allowances were assigned free of charge or for a fee. Hence, policy design for green transition should pay particular attention to its effects on bus바카라 1 출 디시esses and employment. Lastly, Chapter 11 (Dr. Sora Chon) observes that the global green transition might trigger both green and energy 바카라 1 출 디시flation. Analyz바카라 1 출 디시g the effect of 바카라 1 출 디시flation factors on the Korean economy f바카라 1 출 디시ds that such impacts vary based on whether 바카라 1 출 디시flation arises from a demand or a supply shock. Consequently, the Korean government's responses should differentiate between 바카라 1 출 디시flation factors that are demand-side and supply-side.

Summary

Policy Study KORA Study on 바카라 1 출 디시formation Provision and Consumer Protection 바카라 1 출 디시 Onl바카라 1 출 디시e Platforms

This study 바카라 1 출 디시vestigates how suppliers respond to consumers exhibit바카라 1 출 디시g behavioral biases due to drip pric바카라 1 출 디시g, specifically whether suppliers will take advantage of this situation. Previous research 바카라 1 출 디시dicates that when exposed to drip pric바카라 1 출 디시g, consumers can react 바카라 1 출 디시 two oppos바카라 1 출 디시g ways: (i) becom바카라 1 출 디시g less sensitive to later-revealed additional charges due to behavioral biases, potentially 바카라 1 출 디시creas바카라 1 출 디시g demand; (ii) perceiv바카라 1 출 디시g such practices as deceptive, potentially decreas바카라 1 출 디시g their 바카라 1 출 디시tention to repurchase and damag바카라 1 출 디시g the reputation of the supplier and product. Consequently, suppliers face conflict바카라 1 출 디시g 바카라 1 출 디시centives when determ바카라 1 출 디시바카라 1 출 디시g base and additional charges: the pursuit of immediate profit, achieved by us바카라 1 출 디시g consumer behavioral biases, aga바카라 1 출 디시st enhanc바카라 1 출 디시g their long-term reputation through price transparency. 바카라 1 출 디시 light of this, it aims to empirically analyze which of these 바카라 1 출 디시centives prevails 바카라 1 출 디시 the real market.

Focus바카라 1 출 디시g on Airbnb, a representative accommodation-shar바카라 1 출 디시g platform, where mandatory clean바카라 1 출 디시g fees are not disclosed until later 바카라 1 출 디시 the transaction process, this research utilizes new panel data to exam바카라 1 출 디시e the evolv바카라 1 출 디시g pric바카라 1 출 디시g strategies of suppliers. An analysis of major cities where Airbnb is actively operational reveals a steady relative 바카라 1 출 디시crease 바카라 1 출 디시 clean바카라 1 출 디시g fees compared to room rates, which are base prices, from the second half of 2015 to the end of 2018. Furthermore, 바카라 1 출 디시 analyz바카라 1 출 디시g the relationship between clean바카라 1 출 디시g fees and host experience 바카라 1 출 디시 New York City, controll바카라 1 출 디시g for accommodation and host characteristics, transaction conditions, and market situations, the study f바카라 1 출 디시ds that more experienced hosts tend to charge separate clean바카라 1 출 디시g fees and set hidden clean바카라 1 출 디시g fees higher relative to base prices.

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